This paper presents a ''two-group knapsack game''. A number of investors colligate into two groups to bid on a common pool of potential projects. Each investor has his/her own budget limit and a cost estimation for undertaking each possible project. Each group represents a power by its market share. Associated with each project, there is a potential profit that can be realized. Investors in the same group hold an internal agreement of putting the group's collective interest ahead of the individual's interest and not bidding on the same project by more than one investor in the group. The profit of a particular project can be wholly taken by the sole bidder or shared proportionally by two bidders in different groups according to their group power. The objective of each group may be based not only on its own group profit but also on the other group's profit. Assuming that each investor acts in a selfish manner with the best response to optimize its group's objective subject to the budget constraint, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium exists under certain conditions. We also have some interesting findings of the ''price of anarchy'' (the ratio of the worst Nash equilibrium to the social optimum) associated with a simplified version of the two-group knapsack game with three investors.
Introduction
In a competitive market, the market power of an individual investor/company could be strengthened by allying with other investors. Members of an allied group usually hold an internal agreement on pursuing some collective objectives whereas each member controls his/her own budget. This paper presents a ''two-group knapsack game" model to study their investment strategies.
In our model, investors colligate into two groups to bid on a common pool of potential business projects. Each investor has an individual cost base for each project to be charged against his/her own budget. Each group represents a power by its market share. To avoid interest conflict, the members in the same group will not bid on a common project. Each project associates with a potential profit which can be wholly taken by the sole bidder or shared proportionally by two bidders in different groups proportional to their group powers. We assume that each investor acts in a selfish manner with best response to optimize the group's collective objective that may be maximizing the group's total profit, suppressing the opponent group's profit, or combining both factors into consideration.
When each group represents a ''super" corporation with several ''subsidiary" companies, the exercise of collective power, collective group interests, and individual budget limit, becomes a common practice and part of the motivation of our study.
The structure of having multiple investors to receive rewards from investment subject to individual budget constraint links to the multiple knapsack problem in literature. We refer the readers to [10, 5] for some comprehensive surveys and to [17, 19] for the most recent developments on the approximation algorithms. The noncooperative nature of the investors in selecting their potential projects (portfolios) to strengthen the group's objective for competition makes a noncooperative game. Whether there exists a stable state in which no members in a single group can improve the group's collective objective by changing bids unilaterally leads us to the realm of Nash equilibrium [8] . Therefore, we adopt the name of ''two-group knapsack game" for our study. Wang et al. [18] presented a preliminary model called ''two-person knapsack game'', in which only two investors are considered. It can be viewed as a special case of this work.
A Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies always exists in a game with finitely many players and finitely many strategies [8] , but there is no general result on the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium solution. Motivated by the proof of having at least one pure Nash equilibrium solution to the congestion game [11] using the potential function method [7] , Wang et al. [18] derived some existence conditions of pure Nash equilibrium solutions to a two-person knapsack game. They show that it is NP-hard to find a pure Nash equilibrium solution for a two-person knapsack game [18] . Therefore, it remains NP-hard for the general model, two-group knapsack game.
When pure Nash equilibrium solutions exist under certain conditions, the noncooperative nature of the game and the selfish manner of each investor may prevail at the sacrifice of the social welfare. In order to study the impact of investment decisions to the whole society, we quantify pure Nash equilibrium solutions in a simplified two-group knapsack game with three players, by the concept of ''price of anarchy" [6] , which is defined as the ratio of the worst Nash equilibrium to the social optimum. This concept has been a key content in the algorithmic game theory [9] and has been adopted in many fields including the problems of traffic routing [13, 14, 12] , load balancing [6, 3, 2, 16] , facility location [15] , and network design [1, 4] .
If it is not specially mentioned, a Nash equilibrium means a pure Nash equilibrium solution in this paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model and notations of the two-group knapsack game are given in Section 2. The existence conditions of Nash equilibrium are also presented in this section. The concept of the price of anarchy is employed and analyzed for some simplified two-group knapsack games in Section 3. Concluding remarks and future research are included in Section 4.
Preliminaries

Model and notations
The two-group knapsack game can be stated as follows. Suppose that there exist m investors (say, player j for j = 1, 2, . . . , m) bidding on n potential projects (say, project k for k = 1, 2, . . . , n). There associates a potential profit with each of the projects (say, p k for project k, k = 1, 2, . . . , n), while an individual budget limit is associated with each player (say, c j for player j, j = 1, 2, ..., m). To include a specific project k in player j's portfolio, there associates a cost w jk for the player. The players colligate into two groups (say, group t for t = 1, 2). Assume that the first group has l (l < m) players (say, players 1, 2, . . . , l) and the rest of the players belong to group 2. Remember that players in the same group do not bid on any common project. If a player of a particular group is the sole bidder of project k, the profit p k will go to the player (hence to his/her group) in whole. If two players in different groups both select project k, then the profit p k will be shared by them (actually their groups) in proportion to the market power of each group. Here we assume that (1 − α t )p k goes to the investor in group t, t = 1, 2, where 0 ≤ α t ≤ 1. Note that α 1 + α 2 = 1 is NOT assumed here, because the presence of multiple noncooperative players may either stimulate new demands for a bigger market or reduce the total needs for the market.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that c j , p k and w jk are nonnegative integers for j = 1, 2, . . . , m and k = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let S j be the set of projects selected by player j for j = 1, 2, . . . , m. A state of the two-group knapsack game can be described as an ordered pair (G 1 , G 2 ), where
Let w(S j ) be the total cost for player j to undertake all projects in set S j . We say a state (G 1 , G 2 ) is feasible if and only if w(S j ) ≤ c j for j = 1, 2, . . . , m. For a given feasible state (G 1 , G 2 ), let P t (G 1 , G 2 ) be the total profit awarded to the players in group t, t = 1, 2, at this state. Without much confusion, we also use G t to denote the set of projects chosen by all players in group t, t = 1, 2. Then it is not difficult to verify that
where p(G) represents the total profits of the projects in set G.
In this paper, the objective function of each group is assumed to be a linear combination of the profits of both groups. To be more specific, the objective value of group t at state (G 1 , G 2 ) is given by
where t, s = 1, 2, t = s, β tt ≥ 0 and β ts ∈ R. The nonnegativity of β tt indicates that both groups value their own profits positively. When β ts = 0, group t minds only his/her own profit. When β ts > 0, group t is concerned about the weighted gap between his/her profit and the opponent's. When β ts < 0, group t is interested in the weighted total obtainable profits for both groups. In the latter case, we assume that β tt > −β ts to indicate that group t minds his/her own profit more than the opponent's. Substituting (1) into the objectives functions, we have
where ∆ t = α t β tt − α s β ts , for t, s = 1, 2 and t = s.
A state of the knapsack game is called a Nash equilibrium if it is a feasible state at which no group can improve its objective value by changing its portfolio unilaterally. A formal definition is given below. 
Existence of Nash equilibrium
Motivated by the potential function method [7] and the work of Wang et al. [18] , we present an existence condition of pure Nash equilibrium for the two-group knapsack game. Definition 2. For a two-group knapsack game, the potential function of the game is a real valued function defined over the set of feasible states such that its value increases strictly when any group shifts to a new state for an improved objective value.
If ∆ 1 ∆ 2 ≥ 0 for the two-group knapsack game, we may define a function Φ with respect to the feasible state (G 1 , G 2 ) of this game:
Following similar arguments presented in [18] , we can verify that Φ(G 1 , G 2 ) is indeed a potential function of the twogroup knapsack game (detailed proof is given in the Appendix). It is well known that a pure Nash equilibrium solution exists for a game with finitely many feasible states if there associates a potential function with the game. Therefore, we have the following theorem:
for the two-group knapsack game, then there exists at least one pure Nash equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 1 presents a sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium, but it is not a necessary condition.
Consider a simple example with only one project, two players, and the following parameters:
The state ({1}, {1}) is a pure Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, we show that there exists at least one instance without pure Nash equilibrium if ∆ 1 ∆ 2 < 0. Consider the instances such that the cost of project k satisfies w jk > c j for j = 2, . . . , l, l + 2, . . . , m, i.e., only the first player of each group (say, player 1 and player l + 1) can select projects. It is indeed a two-person knapsack game. Wang et al. [18] constructed an instance without pure Nash equilibrium for any two-person knapsack game with ∆ 1 ∆ 2 < 0. We adopt the instance with two projects such that p 1 = p 2 = 1, w 11 = w 12 = c 1 , w l+1,1 = w l+1,2 = c l+1 , and w jk > c j for k = 1, 2, j = 2, . . . , l, l + 2, . . . , m, and then following similar arguments presented in [18] , we can verify that any feasible state is not Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we have the following theorem. Theorem 2. If ∆ 1 ∆ 2 < 0 for the two-group knapsack game, then there exists at least one instance without pure Nash equilibrium.
Price of anarchy
The rest of our work is to adopt the concept of price of anarchy [6] to quantify the Nash equilibrium solutions to a simplified version of the two-group knapsack game.
In this section, the following assumptions are made to simplify our analysis. (i) Only three players are considered, two of them, say players 1 and 2 (without loss of generality, c 1 ≥ c 2 ) form group 1 and player 3 forms group 2 by himself/herself.
(ii) The profit is equally shared if both groups select the same project, i.e., α 1 = α 2 = 1/2. (iii) The two groups have the same objective, either to maximize the gap between its profit and the opponent's, i.e., β tt = 1, β ts = 1 in (2), or to maximize its own profit, i.e., β tt = 1, β ts = 0 in (2). (iv) The cost of selecting project k is the same for all players, i.e., w jk = w k for k = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, 3. Some observations can be made here. First, with the assumption (i), we have G 1 = (S 1 , S 2 ) and G 2 = (S 3 ). Second, by the assumption (ii), the profit of each group at a feasible state (G 1 , G 2 ) becomes
The total profit of the two groups becomes
Third, the assumption (iii) considers two scenarios, namely,
We call the corresponding games a ''competitive two-group knapsack game" and a ''selfish two-group knapsack game'', respectively. Fourth, with the assumptions (ii) and (iii), for each of the two games, it is easy to verify that ∆ t ≥ 0, t = 1, 2. Hence a pure Nash equilibrium exists for each case by Theorem 1. We denote a pure Nash equilibrium solution by
3 ) throughout the paper. If we let z * be the total profit of two groups at the state (G *
We shall quantify the Nash equilibria by the concept of price of anarchy, which is defined to be the ratio of the worst total profit associated with a Nash equilibrium to the social optimum. Here the social optimum is defined to be a feasible state (Ḡ 1 ,Ḡ 2 ) = ((S 1 ,S 2 ),S 3 ) that achieves the maximum total profitz of the two groups. Notice that if there is a project belonging toS i ∩S j for i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i = j, because of the assumption (ii), we can always remove this project from one player's selection list to get a new feasible state without changing the maximum profit. Therefore, we may in general assume thatS i ∩S j = ∅ for i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i = j. Consequently, we haveḠ 1 ∩Ḡ 2 = ∅ and
The following two subsections will analyze the price of anarchy for the ''competitive two-group knapsack game" and ''selfish two-group knapsack game" respectively.
Competitive two-group knapsack game
Remember that in the following analysis, c 1 ≥ c 2 is assumed without loss of generality, (G * 1 , G * 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium, and (Ḡ 1 ,Ḡ 2 ) is a social optimum. Theorem 3. If c 2 < c 3 , the price of anarchy is 1/2 for the competitive two-group knapsack game.
. From the definitions of Nash equilibrium and competitive two-group knapsack game, we know that
Next, we use an instance to show the bound is tight by assuming that c 3 ≤ c 1 . A similar instance can be constructed for the case of c 3 > c 1 . Instance 1. There are two projects. For project 1, w 1 = c 3 and p 1 = 1 + where > 0. For project 2, w 2 = c 1 and p 2 = 1. The feasible state (({1}, {∅}), {1}) is a Nash equilibrium with z * = 1 + , and the feasible state (({2}, {∅}), {1}) achieves the social optimum withz = 2 + . Since z * /z → 1/2 when → 0 for this instance, the bound is tight. Theorem 4. If c 2 ≥ c 3 , the price of anarchy is 2/3 for the competitive two-group knapsack game. Proof. SinceḠ 1 = (S 1 ,S 2 ), we know that the state ((S 1 ,S 2 ), G * 2 ) is feasible. From the definitions of Nash equilibrium and competitive two-group knapsack game, we know that
Combining (9), (10) and (11) . The following instance shows the bound is tight. Table 1 where > 0.
Instance 2. The information of projects is described in
The feasible state (({3}, {1}), {1}) is a Nash equilibrium with z * = 2 + while the feasible state (({3}, {2}), {1}) achieves the social optimum withz = 3 + . Since z * /z → 2/3 when → 0 for this instance, the bound is tight.
Selfish two-group knapsack game
Theorem 5. If c 2 < c 3 , the price of anarchy is 2/3 for the selfish two-group knapsack game. . From the definitions of Nash equilibrium and selfish two-group knapsack game, we know that
As the social optimal state (Ḡ 1 ,Ḡ 2 ) satisfies thatḠ 1 
Combining (12) and (13), we have 
Proof.
It is easy to see that ((S 1 ,S 2 ), G * 2 ) is a feasible state. From the definitions of Nash equilibrium and selfish two-group knapsack game, we know
Since c 1 ≥ c 2 ≥ c 3 , we know that ((S 1 ,S 3 ), G * 2 ) and ((S 2 ,S 3 ), G * 2 ) are feasible states. With a similar discussion of obtaining (14), we have Combining (14), (15) and (16), we havē From (17) and (18), we havē
On the other hand, from (14), we have
(20) 
From (20) and (21), we havē
From (19) and (22), we have
The following instance shows the bound is tight.
Instance 4.
The information of projects is described in Table 2 with > 0 being a sufficiently small number.
We can verify that the feasible state (({2}, {1 ∪ 4}), {1}) is a Nash equilibrium with z * = 5 + , and the feasible state (({3}, {1 ∪ 4}), {2}) achieves the social optimum withz = 7 + . Since z * /z → 5/7 when → 0 for this instance, the bound is tight. Proof. It is easy to see that the state (G *
From the definitions of Nash equilibrium and selfish two-group knapsack game, we know that
Since c 2 = c 3 , we can similarly obtain that
Combining these results, we havē
We have assumed
Noticing that (19) holds for c 1 ≥ c 2 ≥ c 3 , we havē
(27) Combining (26) and (27), we have
. The following instance shows the bound is tight.
Instance 5. The information of projects is described in Table 3 with > 0 being a sufficiently small number. It can be verified that the feasible state (({1 ∪ 2}, {3 ∪ 4}), {1 ∪ 2}) is a Nash equilibrium with z * = 7 + 2 , and the feasible state (({1 ∪ 3}, {2 ∪ 5}), {4 ∪ 6}) achieves the social optimum withz = Proof. Notice that (14) and (15) hold for c 1 ≥ c 2 ≥ c 3 . Therefore, we have
Since (24) and (25) hold for c 2 = c 3 , we have
We have assumed thatS i ∩S j = ∅, i, j = 1, 2, 3, i = j, therefore, 
Combining (31) and (32), we have
Instance 6. The information of projects is described in Table 4 
Similarly, the state ((
2 ) is also feasible, and then
AsS i ∩S j = ∅ for i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i = j, it is easy to verify that
Together with (33) and (34), we have
Hence we havē 
On the other hand, noticing that p(
Combining (38) and (39) to eliminate λ, we have
Consequently, we obtain the desired result that z * ≥ 3 4z
Instance 7.
The information of projects is described in Table 5 with > 0 being sufficiently small. It can be verified that the feasible state (({2}, {1}), {1}) is a Nash equilibrium with z * = 3 + , and the feasible state (({2}, {3}), {1}) achieves the social optimum withz = 4 + . Since z * /z → 3/4 when → 0 for this instance, the bound is tight.
Concluding remarks
This paper has introduced a new model called the two-group knapsack game, which is flexible to accommodate some interesting scenarios for real-life applications. We have shown that a pure Nash equilibrium solution exists under certain conditions. We have also investigated the price of anarchy associated with two simplified two-group knapsack games. 
The price of anarchy analysis has illustrated some potential reductions of social welfare due to specific economic behaviors of different business groups. In our simplified two-group knapsack game, only three players are considered: two (with budgets c 1 and c 2 , and c 1 ≥ c 2 ) of them are in the first group, and the third player (with budgets c 3 ) forms the second group by himself/herself. For the ''competitive two-group knapsack game," the price of anarchy is 1/2 if c 2 < c 3 and 2/3 if c 2 ≥ c 3 . For the ''selfish two-group knapsack game'', the price of anarchy is sensitive to the budgets of players, and Table 6 summarizes our findings in which c 1 ≥ c 2 is generally assumed.
It is interesting to note that, for a game with three players, no matter the game is competitive or selfish, the worst price of anarchy (1/2 for the competitive game and 2/3 for the selfish game) happens when the player with the least budget colligates with another player to form a group. Therefore, from the social welfare point view, it may be better to leave the player with the least budget alone forming a group by himself/herself. In other words, inducing the two players with higher budgets to ally together avoiding their internal fights could result in a higher level of total social profit. This is particularly true when their budgets are high enough (c 1 ≥ c 2 ≥ 2c 3 ) in a selfish two-group knapsack game. The price of anarchy archives the best case at 3/4.
Our results bring up a new model with many subjects for further investigation. For example, when each group has a different objective function (mixed game of selfish and competitive) or there are two players in each group, how does one conduct the price of anarchy analysis?
Proof. 1. If ∆ 1 = ∆ 2 = 0, Eq. (3) becomes
If there is any group, assumed to be group 1 without loss of generality, can improve its objective by shifting to a feasible state G 1 , then O 1 (G 1 , G 2 ) < O 1 (G 1 , G 2 ) . Consequently, we have β 11 p(G 1 ) < β 11 p(G 1 ). Since β 11 ≥ 0 is generally assumed, we know p(G 1 ) < p(G 1 ), which implies that Φ(G 1 , G 2 ) < Φ(G 1 , G 2 ). Therefore, Φ(G 1 , G 2 ) is a potential function for this case from Definition 2. 
For the case ∆ 1 = 0 and ∆ 2 = 0, we have 
